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GIFT AND LEASEBACK: PLANNING
PERSPECTIVES IN AN UNLEGISLATED FIELD
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past twenty-five years, the intra-family gift
and leaseback transaction has developed into an extremely
popular and successful income-shifting device. Its use, how-
ever, is fraught with peril since no provision of the Internal
Revenue Code' of 1954 [hereinafter the Code] expressly covers
such exchanges. Despite the existence of this frequently and
diversely litigated tax-minimization niche, Congress has yet to
pass a single piece of legislation to smooth or define its con-
tours.2 Nor has the Treasury issued an applicable Regulation.
3
This complete dependence upon the common law of taxation,
coupled with the few imprecise guidelines thus far judicially
delineated, prompted the Internal Revenue Service
[hereinafter IRS] to place transfer and leaseback cases4 on its
1 26 U.S.C. §1 et seq. (1972) [THE INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 is hereinafter cited as
CoDE].
I With each new case that is issued in the field, the law review articles invariably
implore Congress to enact either prohibitive or prophylactic legislation. Some are:
Cohen, Transfer and Leasebacks to Trust: Tax and Planning Considerations, 43 VA.
L. REV. 31 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Cohen]; Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of In-
come: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P. G. Lake Case, 17 TAX L. REV. 295 (1962)
thereinafter cited as Lyon & Eusticel; Oliver, Income Tax Aspects of Gifts and Lease-
backs of Business Property in Trust, 51 CORNELL L. Q. 21 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Oliver]. Price, "Eat, Drink and Be Merry" at the Expense of the Federal Fisc., 49
TAXES 175 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Price]; Webster, Transfer to Trusts with Lease-
backs-Drafting and Other Suggestions for the Trust and Lease Agreements, U. So.
CAL. 1956 TAX INST. 319; Note, Gift and Leaseback-Tax Planning in the Shadows of
Assignment of Income and Business Purpose, 62 GEo. L.J. 209 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Note GEO.); Note, Gift and Leaseback: A Continuing Tax Controversy, 4
LOYOLA L.J. 371 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Note LOYOLA]; Note, The Gift and Lease-
back: A New Tax Avoidance Gimmick, 51 YALE L.J. 1529 (1950); COLUM. L. REV. 247
(1951); 65 HARv. L. REV. 1250 (1952).
3 Treas. Reg. §1.671-1(c) (1956) is the only regulation that mentions rent deduc-
tion under short term trusts. It specifies that compliance with §671 of the Code will
not affect the deductibility of the rent.
' Each issue is assigned an eight digit code by the Internal Revenue Service,
designated by section, topic and subtopic. Under §162 is the topic (09) Rents and
Royalties; the subtopic (06) is Conveyance and Leaseback. Presumably this is for
standardization of research, litigation and legislation; it is also geared to instant com-
puter analysis. Uniform Issue List No. 0162.09-06 (11-19-73), 1 CCH INT. REV. MANuAL:
INT. REV. SERv. MANUAL MT1275-8 (10-6-72).
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1973 "prime issue' list-a list of issues which the Service
would rather litigate than settle. The cases thus precipitated
are now emerging from the courts, and the questions around
which they revolve are moving all the closer to final resolution.
Transfer and leaseback cases may turn on any of several
points, but a typical fact pattern can be illustrated as follows:
T, a professional who owns a highly depreciated office building
and furniture, transfers it to an independent trustee for a pe-
riod of 12 years for the benefit of his minor children, paying the
applicable gift tax' and retaining a reversion. He immediately
leases the property back from the trustee for a specified
amount for the first five years and by agreement of both parties
thereafter.
The pertinent issue is whether the rental payments made
by the lessee are deductible under §162(a) (3)7 of the Code. This
section, entitled "Trade or Business Expense" provides:
(a) In General-There shall be allowed as a deduction
all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred dur-
ing the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business,
including...
(3) rentals or other payments required to be made as a
condition to the continued use or possession, for purposes of
the trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has
not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity.
In the fact pattern outlined above, the lessee would deduct his
I Prime issues are those that the IRS will ordinarily insist on litigating and that
will not ordinarily be conceded or compromised. The wording of the "prime issue"
involving trust and leaseback cases is:
1wihether a taxpayer may deduct "rental" payments made to a family
Clifford Trust where the payments are made for the use of an office building
or other property which the taxpayer conveyed to the trust and simultane-
ously leased back under a predetermined arrangement.
National Office List of Prime Issues, July 16, 1973, 737 CCH 1973 STAND. FED. TAX
REP. §6527, at 71.323 (citations omitted). See also, 1 J. RABKIN & M. JOHNSON, FEDERAL
INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION §6.03(3) (Supp. 1974), citing INT. REv. SERv.
MANuAL MT1277-7 (July 16, 1973). One author has noted the "unwisdom of planning
one's way into litigation." He explains prime issues as "ones which, if raised, cannot,
as a matter of IRS policy, be 'settled' by closing agreement or compromise and there-
fore must be litigated." He suggests that no reversion should be retained and that the
leaseback should not be negotiated prior to the transfer. Simmons, New Developments
in the "Gift and Leaseback" in Tax Planning for the Professional, 51 TAXES 654, 658
(1973).
* John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200 (1956), acquiesced in 1957-2 CuM BULL 6.
Same as INT. REV. CODE OF 1939, §23(a)(1)(A).
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rental payments from his income because he is contractually
obligated to make them "as a condition to the continued use
or possession" of the premises. His minor children are in a
much lower tax bracket than he, and, assuming all trust in-
come is passed to the beneficiaries, are taxed on the amount
of the rent less their deductible expenses. The difference in the
marginal tax rates times the net income8 is the after-tax sav-
ings.9
The Internal Revenue Service has attacked such tax-
saving procedures as elevating "form over substance,"'" stating
that a mere paper-shuffling without a change of management
or control of the asset should not yield a reduction in taxes.
Specifically, the Commissioner has disallowed the deductions
by claiming the payments were outside the provisions of
a Meyer, Tax Aspects of Lease Transactions, 23 TAx EXEC. 616 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Meyer].
I The marginal tax rate is the tax rate at which the next dollar of income will be
taxed. We can illustrate the tax-savings formula in the test using F, the father whose
marginal tax rate is 50%, and S, the son whose marginal tax rate is 20%. The rent paid
is $15,000 and the operating expenses of maintenance, depreciation, insurance, taxes
and interest are $10,000. S pays tax on the income less expenses (20%) ($15,000 -
$10,000) = (20%) ($5,000) = $1000. However, since F now has a $15,000 (rent) deduc-
tion rather than the $10,000 deduction he had before giving the asset away, he saves
tax on the additional $5,000 of income offset by the deduction, thus saving (50%)
($15,000 - $10,000) = (50%) ($5,000) = $2500. The net tax savings would therefore be
$2500 - $1000 = $1500. The formula in the text yields the same results: the difference
in marginal tax rates times the net income is (50% - 20%) ($15,000 - $10,000) = (30%)
($5000) = $1500.
If S is a minor child, he very likely will be below the 20% tax level. If he has no
other income, then the net income from the trust will be reduced only by the personal
exemption. The standard deduction and low income allowance apply only to earned
income. See also Josephs & Glicker, The Short-Term Trust: How to Capitalize on this
Often Overlooked Tax-Saving Tool, 7 PRAC. AccT. May/June, 1974, at 36, 39-41
[hereinafter Josephs & Glicker].
One alternative to gift and leaseback is to employ the minor child. This is quite a
simple technique to shift earned income. This is limited by the fact that a profes-
sional's work is normally quite skilled, and there are few tasks in the office able to be
performed by a child. In addition, the IRS will scrutinize the transaction closely and
strictly apply the standard of reasonable salary and compensation of CODE §162(a)(1).
See, How to Turn Your Children's Spending Money Into a Deductible Business Ex-
pense, PLANNING CLOSELY-HELD CORPORATION IDEAS 1974, at 1 (Inst. of Business Plan-
ning). See also Rev. Rul. 73-393, 1973 INT. REv. BULL. No. 39, at 9, superceding I.T.
3812 and Rev. Rul. 59-110.
1 The taxpayer may decrease his tax liability by any legal means. "[W]hile this
may be doctrine, it is not dogma and certainly it does not confer a license to substitute
form for substance." 38 P-H TAx CT. MEM 69,171 at 69-917 (1969), quoting Irvine
K. Furman, 45 T.C. 360, 364 (1966).
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§162(a)(3). In support of this stance, he has relied upon four
different theories:" (1) The payments are not "ordinary and
necessary" expenses because there was no reason to make the
gift and therefore no reason to incur the rental obligation of the
leaseback;' 2 (2) they are not "rentals," but rather a forbidden
assignment of income;'3 (3) they are not "payments required to
be made as a condition for continued use" because the transfer
was a sham resulting in a bare titular change with no alteration
in the essence of ownership; 4 and (4) the payments are made
on property in which the taxpayer has an equitable interest due
to his retention of the reversion.' 5 In general, the taxpayer has
overcome these arguments and prevailed in those cases in
which he has made a valid gift, has divested himself of control
of the asset and has paid a reasonable rent.
In addition, the taxpayer's success usually depends on the
court's determination of whether the transaction has a valid
"business purpose"; if the court discerns such a purpose, the
rent is ordinarily deductible as a business expense. The finding
of a "business purpose" in turn depends upon whether the
court examines the purpose of the entire, integrated "gift-and-
leaseback" transaction or the purpose of the leaseback only. If
the court separates the gift from the leaseback and then seeks
to determine if there is a valid business purpose for leasing
equipment used in the lessor's trade or business, it will invaria-
bly find that a valid business purpose does exist and allow the
deduction.'6 If, however, the court looks at the "gift-and-
leaseback" as one united transaction, it will hold that there is
" Although theoretically distinct, the first three theories are often indistin-
guishable in their application by the courts and are different expressions of the same
requirement: that the grantor relinquishes complete control of the asset and that the
parties deal as if they were unrelated.
12 See, e.g., Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 834 (1955); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
343 U.S. 928 (1952).
3 See, e.g., Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 814 (1965).
" See, e.g., Sidney W. Penn, 51 T.C. 144 (1968).
,5 Gibbons v. United States, 25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-1332 (D.N. Mex. 1970);
Chace v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 512 (M.D. Fla. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 422 F.2d
292 (1970); Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962).
,1 C. James Mathews, 61 T.C. 12 (1973); Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965);
Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954), not acquiesced in, 1956-2 CuM. BuLL. 10.
[Vol. 63
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no valid business purpose to be achieved by giving away an
asset and then incurring an obligation to rent it back; in such
cases, the deduction will be denied." Still, it should be noted
that in a majority of courts, the deduction will not be denied
solely on the ground that there is no valid business purpose:
The gift and leaseback device is advantageous to profes-
sionals because of (1) its simplicity, (2) the lack of disturbance
to the professional-client relationships, (3) the fact that the
professional has almost no other method to divert his income
and (4) the attactiveness of producing a tax-savings from
"locked-in" assets.' 8 A taxpayer who deals in goods can divert
his income by giving stock in his company to his children.
However, since Lucas v. Earl,'9 in which the Supreme Court
held an attorney taxable on an attempted assignment of his
income, the professional has had few opportunities to effec-
tively shift his income so that for him the gift and leaseback
may well be the "only game in town"." Even though a profes-
sional produces his income through intangible personal services
(i.e., skill and time), he still often requires a battery of fixed
assets. By saving taxes on these "non-income producing'' as-
sets, he gains an offset to the "sunken costs" they represent.
The above example dealt with an office building and furni-
ture, but gift and leaseback can be used by doctors, dentists,
engineers and architects for their equipment, and lawyers and
accountants for their libraries. Similarly, it can apply to au-
thors and inventors for their copyrights and patents. By the use
of additional first year depreciation and accelerated deprecia-
tion methods," tangible assets can be depreciated to a low book
11 Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814
(1965); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928
(1952). See also Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951).
1S ee also J. CHOMMIE, FEDERAL INcoME TAxATiON § 157, at 478-481 (1973); Meyer,
supra note 7, at 634; Simmons, The Use of Trusts in Tax Planning for the Professional,
50 TAxES 420 (1972); Smith, Shifting Income Within the Family Group, 30 TAXES 995,
1000-1001 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Smith]; Note, The Use of Business Property
as Short-Term Corpus, 19 VAND. L. REV. 811, 812-25 (1966).
It 281 U.S. 111 (1930). Strong, Selected Income Tax Considerations for
Professionals, 15 PRAc. LAw., Jan., 1969, at 20.
21 Simmons, Gift and Leaseback Arrangements Involving Property Used in a Pro-
fessional Practice, 48 L.A. BAR ASS'N BuLL. 62-65 (1972).
21 CODE §167(a). See also Note GEO., supra note 2, at 210 n. 8. If the trust instru-
ment requires a depreciation reserve, then the entire deduction is allowed; otherwise,
it must be apportioned on the basis of trust income to each beneficiary, §§ 167(h),
1975]
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value but still retain a large fair market rental value. At this
point, where the rental value far exceeds the depreciation,
taxes, interest and maintenance expenses, the benefits of the
gift and leaseback as an income shifting and tax-minimization
measure become evident. As noted above, the grantor-lessee
(at a higher tax rate) gets a full deduction of the rent and the
lessors (at a lower tax rate) pay tax on the difference between
the rent and the above-enumerated expenses. If the asset is a
building with land, this allows the high-bracket taxpayer to
effectively write off the land with rental payments where he




Sale and leaseback transfers became popular in 1944, al-
though their origin can be traced to as early as 1882.Y The gift
and leaseback followed closely as an early post-World War II
tax saving transaction. Notwithstanding this common origin
the two devices differ significantly in their function and pur-
pose. For example, while the sale and leaseback usually in-
volves two unrelated businesses bargaining at arms-length for
their individual benefit,2 the gift and leaseback 2 is often be-
tween two related parties calculating for the benefit of the total
economic unit. Because of these diverse purposes, the sale and
leaseback 27 is not within the scope of this comment and will be
discussed only peripherally. Likewise, neither net leases,2 1 the
642(e). A trust cannot take additional first year depreciation. §179(d)(4). Brausing,
The Trust Leaseback as a Tax Saving Device, 14 PRAc. LAW., Oct., 1968, at 75 [here-
inafter cited as Brausing].
2 Brausing, supra note 21, at 74.
2 For two excellent treatments of the introductory and historical portions of a gift
and leaseback analysis, see Cohen, supra note 2 and Oliver, supra note 2. For a varied
approach see Note LOYOLA, supra note 2 and Note GEo., supra note 2.
24 Yorkshire Ry. Wagon Co. v. Maclure, 21 Ch.D. 309 (1882), cited in Cary,
Corporate Financing Through the Sale and Leaseback of Property, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1948) [hereinafter cited as Cary I].
Cary, Current Tax Problems in Sale, or Gift, and Leaseback Transactions,
N.Y.U. 9TH INST. ON FED. TAX 959, 959-60 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Cary II].
2, Id. at 974-78.
2 For a history of sale and leaseback see Cary II, supra note 25. See also Cary I,
supra note 24; Mickey, Some Considerations of Sale or Gift and Lease-back, N.Y.U.
9TH INST. ON FED. TAX., 979, 979-984(1951) [hereinafter cited as Mickey].
21 Howard, The Essential Elements of a Net Lease, 8 PRAc. LAW., Feb., 1962, at
[Vol. 63
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intricacies of lease planning, 9 the problems of purchases de-
nominated as lease,3 nor the use of leasebacks with exempt
organizations will be covered.3
The first leading case involving the gift and leaseback,
Skemp v. Commissioner,32 was decided in 1948. Therein, the
grantor, a doctor, transferred his office to an independent trus-
tee for the benefit of his children and his wife. The duration of
the trust was 20 years, after which the corpus was to be distrib-
uted to the children. The trustee immediately leased the office
back to the grantor doctor for 10 years at $500 a month for the
first two years, after which the rent was to be renegotiated,
with an arbiter to be used if an impasse resulted. In considering
this transfer, the tax court stated as fact that the "[p]etitioner
has not exercised any dominion or control over the trust prop-
erty, except to occupy. . . . -33 Nevertheless, later in the opin-
ion it concluded that because the gift and leaseback was prear-
ranged and consummated on the same day, it could not "see
in the circumstances before [it] a passing to the trust of that
degree of dominion and control, in praesenti, as to the lease-
hold estate which is requisite to passage of a gift." 3 The court
of appeals, however, reversed the decision, declaring that while
the situation was voluntarily undertaken, it created a valid,
enforcible requirement to make rental payments and thus was
an "ordinary and necessary" expense.
A. Valid Gift and Complete Transfer
The tax court opinion in Skemp highlights the first prere-
quisite to allowing the ultimate rent deduction, a valid gift.
35
Obviously, the formalities of state gift law must be followed in
1' Baskes, Tax Planning for Lease Transactions, 1972 ILL. L.F. 482. See also Rev.
Rul. 540, 1955-2 CUM. BuLL. 39.
10 Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1955); Rev. Rul. 122, 1960-
1 CUM. BULL. 56.
31 Note, Criticized Uses of Federal Tax Exemption Privileges by Charitable Foun-
dations and Educational Institutions, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 696, 698-700 (1950). See
Mickey, supra note 27, at 84-85.
32 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948), rev'g 8 T.C. 415 (1947).
- 8 T.C. 415, 419 (1947).
m Id. at 421.
33 See Rev. Rul. 315, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 624; Yohlin, Assignment and Deflection
of Income, N.Y.U. 20TH INST. ON FED. TAx 147, 147-49 (1962).
1975]
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order to initiate the gift and leaseback. The courts have split
in their decisions as to the deductibility of payments required
under other voluntarily created obligations," and the pivotal
question may be whether a transaction is in reality what it is
in form.37
Implicit in the phrase "valid gift" is the necessity of a
complete transfer. As will be seen, it is upon this requirement
that most of the gift and leaseback cases turn.
B. Orientation of the Courts
It is an established maxim of tax law, reiterated often by
Judge Learned Hand, 38 that one may use every legitimate
means to avoid taxes.3 Equally well-founded, however, are the
principles that: (1) deductions are not a right but rather a
matter of legislative grace; and (2) the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue is presumed correct in his determination that a
particular deduction claimed lies outside the bounds of this
privilege. 0 The Commissioner casts a jaundiced eye toward
transactions which are entered into solely for purposes of tax
avoidance, and it is up to the courts to decide if this motive will
invalidate the deduction.
The taxpayers' success in obtaining such a deduction, ac-
cording to one author,4' may depend upon whether the court's
orientation is that where "the parties deal fairly with one an-
other, it matters not whether their aim be . . . to avoid taxes
or to regenerate the world, 4 2 or instead is that one cannot
Notes established gratuitously have been valid for interest deductions where the
obligation is enforcible at law. Preston v. Commissioner, 132 F.2d 763 (2d Cir. 1942);
Commissioner v. Parkt, 113 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1940). However, many courts have re-
jected interest deductions paid on voluntarily-incurred indebtedness.
" Johnson v. Commissioner, 86 F.2d 710 (2d Cir. 1936), aff'g 33 B.T.A. 1003
(1936).
38 Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77
YALE L.J. 440, 447 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Chirelstein].
3, Gregory/v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935).
40 Intrastate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943):
And we examine the argument in the light of the now familiar rule that an
income tax deduction is a matter of legislative grace and that the burden of
clearly showing the right to the claimed deduction is on the taxpayer. New
Colonial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440.
" Webster, Transfers to Trusts with Leasebacks-Drafting and Other Suggestions
for the Trust and Lease Agreements, U. So. CAL. 1956 TAx INsT. 319, 358 (1956).
42 Steams Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 849, 852 (7th Cir. 1954),
[Vol. 63
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"divide single tax earnings into two tax units by the simple
expedient of drawing up papers. 4 3 Within the intra-farily gift
and leaseback field, both views have been espoused.4 For ex-
ample, in 1951 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in a decision followed by other courts, held that
a gift and leaseback rent deduction should be disallowed since
it would "hide business reality behind paper pretense."45 In
contrast, the tax court has since taken the position that the




Each post-Skemp gift and leaseback decision has brought
a flood of analysis from legal scholars.17 Typically, these com-
mentators report the determination of the facts, the court's
interpretation of prior case law and the case's impact on future
tax planning. Likewise, one feature of nearly all such works is
a warning of the risks of gift and leaseback tax planning due
to the uncertainty in this area of the law; the warning is invari-
ably followed by a call for appropriate legislation. 8
Such commentary is largely precipitated by the fact that
the Code does not have a provision dealing with the intra-
family gift and leaseback. The only mention of such transfers
in committee reports comes from the Senate report which,
while speaking of grantor trusts, states: "This sub-part also has
no application in determining the right of a grantor to deduc-
quoting Chilsom v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 14, 15 (2d Cir. 1932). Learned Hand wrote
the Chilsom opinion; see Chirelstein, supra note 38.
4 Paul G. Greene, 7 T.C. 142, 151 (1946).
" Stearns Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1954).
' White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398, 400 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
928 (1952). See also Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 814 (1965); Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962); White
is discussed in GRISWOLD, FEDERAL TAXATION 312-18 (1960); Smith, supra note 18, at
1000-01; 65 HARv. L. REv. 1250 (1952).
11 Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965). This case is discussed in Beausang, Tax
Court in Oakes Gives New Life to Trust Leaseback as a Tax Saving Device, 23 J. TAX.
156 (1965); Kornfield, A New Look at Family Trust-Leaseback Arrangements, 104
TRusTs AND ESTATES 1121, 1186 (1965).
See, e.g., those articles cited supra note 2.
" Some examples of such scholarly warnings may be found among the articles
cited supra note 2.
1975]
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tions for payments to a trust under a transfer and leaseback
agreement."49 The House report does not even contain this
sentence," though the treasury regulations have adopted it." It
has been suggested that since there is no legislation in this
area, the parties to an intra-family gift and leaseback should
be held to the same standard as unrelated parties;52 that al-
though-intra-family transactions may be fertile ground for tax
abuse, and the dealing should be scrutinized to see if the par-
ties do what they say they will do, the Commissioner should not
apply a different standard without legislation to that effect.
Certainly, there is a sound basis for this approach; the Com-
missioner has procured section 267 which disallows losses in
sales between related parties. In the absence of analogous legis-
lation in the intra-family gift and leaseback field, the Commis-
sioner perhaps ought to look closer at these transactions, but
should not judge them more harshly than if they were between
unrelated participants.
In the absence of a statute or consistent case law, tax
planning in this area is precarious at best. Many have at-
tempted to analogize the trust and leaseback to the Clifford
trust,"13 but Treasury Regulation §1.671-1(c), alluded to above,
explicitly states that these are conceptually different. The
Clifford provisions deal with control of the trust for income
attribution purposes, while the trust and leaseback concerns
control of the trust as it affects the deductibility of an "ordi-
nary and necessary expense." Still, the two concepts do overlap
in their concurrent desire to divest the grantor of control of the
asset; as stated earlier, a complete transfer54 is necessary for
effective use of gift and leaseback. If the transfer is not com-
plete, the rent is not a deductible expense (not "necessary")
and may be a gift, thus incurring a greater tax liability. More-
over, some feel that in the absence of any other guidelines,
41 S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 365 (1954).
10 H.R. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. A212 (1954).
5, Treas. Reg. §1.671-1(c) (1956).
52 Lyon & Eustice, supra note 2, at 340.
5 Helvering v. Clifford, 293 U.S. 465 (1935). Intrafamily transactions are subject
to closer scrutiny than others are; nonetheless, they should not necessarily be subject
to a higher standard of deductibility. The statutes passed subsequent to this opinion
are aimed at regulating grantor control and income division of the trust. CODE § § 671-
77. Numerous regulations and rulings interpret these sections.
51 Material cited supra notes 35-37 and accompanying text.
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establishing a Clifford trust should be held to be a complete
transfer for purposes of rent deduction. 5 In any event, such
attempts to shed light on the gift and leaseback by analogy
serve only to further demonstrate the need for specific, decisive
legislation in this area of tax law.
III. RECENT DECISIONS
Pursuant to the Internal Revenue Service "prime issue"
directive,-6 gift and leaseback cases are being vigorously liti-
gated. The most recent tax court decision is C. James
Mathews,57 which originated when the Mathews transferred a
funeral home used by Mr. Mathews in his business to their
attorney as the trustee of four ten-year trusts for their minor
children. The reversion initally was retained by the grantors,
but was later transferred to another trust for the children. The
Commissioner disallowed the petitioner's rental deductions for
the time prior to the reversion relinquishment. It should be
noted that the Commissioner did not challenge the deduction
after the reversion was transfered; as will be developed more
fully later, this may indicate that he is now willing to concede
trust and leaseback rental deductions where the grantor trans-
fers the property to an independent trustee and does not retain
a reversion.-"
In the early years of gift and leaseback litigation, the tax
court took a hard line against allowing the rental deduction,
but its views have liberalized since then.59 In the Mathews
5 Cary II, supra note 25, at 977-78. At 974, Cary opines that "gift and leaseback
might be classified as a collateral relative of the Clifford trust and the family partner-
ship." Price, supra note 2, at 176 states that the difference is between reallocation of
income and the validity of a deduction.
" The "prime issue" directive is discussed supra note 5.
57 61 T.C. 12, 61 P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 61.3 (1973). See also 4 AIA
TAXATION COORDINATOR 4810.1, at 35,826A-B (Recent Developments, Aug. 29, 1974).
5' Josephs & Glicker, supra note 9, at 40.
31 In its first two gift and leaseback cases, the tax court denied the deductions,
but was reversed on appeal. Brown v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 1095 (1949), rev'd, 180
F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 814 (1950); Skemp v. Commissioner, 8 T.C.
415 (1947), rev'd, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948). The facts of Skemp are given supra in
the text; the Brown facts are similar. The results of these appeals drew fire from the
Commissioner: Rev. Rul. 9, 1954-1 CuM. BuLL. 20, modified by, Rev. Rul. 315, 1957-2
CUM. BuLL. 624. Brown is discussed in Cary II, supra note 25, at 974; Note, The Gift
and Leaseback: A New Tax Avoidance Gimmick, 59 YALE L.J. 1529 (1951); 51 COLUM.
L. REV. 247 (1951).
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opinion, Judge Hall synthesized from the diverse and disparate
decisions of the various jurisdictions a three-prong test for al-
lowing the rental deductions:
(1) The grantor must not retain "substantially the
same control over the property that he had before."...
(2) The leaseback should normally be in writing and
must require payment of a reasonable rental.
(3) The leaseback (as distinguished from the gift) must
have a bona fide business purpose [citations omitted]."0
Finding that the petitioner had satisfied each of these require-
ments, the court then looked to §162(a)(3) of the Code, which
allows the taxpayer's rent deduction only for "property . . .
in which he has no equity." The Commissioner argued that
this excluded the petitioner's deduction since he had retained
an equitable interest, the reversion. The court, however, con-
cluded that the language was directed at a sale purported to
be a lease and that the rental payments should not be lost
merely because the taxpayer owned a property interest that
became possessory upon the expiration of a term of years.
The Mathews decision is now on appeal to the Fifth Cir-
cuit, which has ruled against the rental deduction when a re-
version is retained in all three gift and leaseback cases it has
decided. The tax court distinguished Mathews from those
three-Chace v. United States,"' Van Zandt v. United States
6 2
and Furman v. United States' 3-saying that in each of them
the deduction was disallowed because there was no indepen-
dent trustee, a factor not present in Mathews, in which an
attorney served as trustee. An affirmance by the Fifth Circuit
would not only further clarify the law, but it would also signal
a change from the hostility with which this court initially
viewed gift and leaseback transactions.
In the meantime, judicial formulations like the tax court's
three-pronged test, analyzed below, may provide the tax plan-
The Tax Court began to favor the taxpayer in the cases of Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C.
794 (1954), not acquiesced in, 1956-2 CuM. BuLL. 10 and Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524
(1965). See also note 46 supra.
61 T.C. 12, - ; 61 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEc. T 61.3, at 61-10, 61-11
(1973).
5, 422 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970), affg per curiam 303 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
62 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965).
- 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'g per curiam 45 T.C. 360 (1966).
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ner with his only guidance in attacking the difficult problems
of the gift and leaseback.
A. Independent Trustee
The tax court's requirement that the grantor must not
continue to maintain "substantially the same control"6 over
the transferred property is satisfied by a transfer to an indepen-
dent trustee with real powers of corpus control, rental negotia-
tion, and lease enforcement. It is unrealistic to think that the
leaseback element of "trust and leaseback" transactions is not
prearranged, but the tax court in Mathews was not disturbed
by this since the trustee owed a fiduciary duty to the benefici-
aries. Indeed, the courts have generally assumed that this fidu-
ciary duty provides sufficient impetus for the trustee not to
allow the grantor-lessee an inordinate amount of control over
the property.'5 Although there will nearly always be some col-
laboration between the trustee and the grantor, the possibility
of a suit by the beneficiaries will usually keep such activities
within tolerable limits. Thus, while the Commissioner may
argue that the grantor has retained substantially the same con-
trol after the transfer as before it (especially where the terms
of the leaseback are negotiated prior to the transfer to the
trust), he will not be successful if an independent trustee with
substantial powers is chosen. This is also true where the tax-
payer transfers cash in trust and the trustee buys assets pre-
viously specified by the grantor.
The existence of an independent trustee is taken by some
courts to be prima facie proof that the grantor has relinquished
management control. Who qualifies as an independent trustee,
however, is a matter of controversy. Corporate trustees, banks,
" 61 T.C. 12, _ ; 61 P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. T 61.3, at 61-10.
63 Brown v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814
(1950), Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948), and Alden B. Oakes, 44
T.C. 524 (1965) all had independent trustees and prearranged leasebacks and were all
granted the deduction. The cases with prearranged leasebacks where the deduction
was denied have never used this as an independent justification for the denial. Van
Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965),
(whole transaction had only a salutory effect); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d
Cir. 1951), cert. denied 343 U.S. 928 (1952) (grantor retained control); Sidney W. Penn,
51 T.C. 144 (1968) (unreasonable rent).
" Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954), not acquiesced in, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 10.
Felix is discussed in Gold, Trust and Leaseback, 40 A.B.A.J. 714 (1954).
1975]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
savings and loan associations, and trust companies generally
qualify, unless the terms of the trust so gird the trustee that
he has no power. The court will not look beyond the trust
instrument with a corporate trustee, assuming that the trustee
is actually independent and will do everything for the benefici-
aries that the trust agreement permits.67
On the other hand, where the taxpayer's spouse acts as
trustee," the court's scrutiny goes beyond the trust agreement
into the workings of the arrangement itself." In such cases, the
transfer of control must be real and not merely apparent. 70
Thus, the wife, in conjunction with the taxpayer's father, an
accountant, can qualify as independent. Where the taxpayer
himself is the trustee, 72 he will not be allowed a deduction,
since the roles of lessor and lessee which he must occupy simul-
taneously, are adverse. However, where the taxpayer or the
spouse is -appointed legal guardian for the eventual beneficiar-
ies before becoming the trustee, the result may be different.
7 3
Since the guardian's actions must be judicially approved, the
courts generally allow the deductions unless the appointment
is found to be part of a bad faith tax avoidance scheme, in
which case no such allowance will be granted. 74 Accountants
and attorneys are generally considered independent where the
trust documents provide them with sufficient powers to main-
17 See, e.g., Perry v. United States, 33 Am. Fed. Tax R. 2d 74-725 (E.D.N.C. 1974);
Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954), not acquiesced in, 1956-2 CuM. BuLL. 10.
0 Brothers will also undergo additional scrutiny. It has been held where two
brothers execute cross-guardianship agreements for the benefit of their respective
nephews and neices, who own the fields that their own fathers farm, then there is no
substance to the transactions and the deductions taken will be denied. Kirschenmann
v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955).
69 Irvine K. Furman, 45 T.C. 360 (1966), afrd per curiam, 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir.
1967). This case is noted in B. BrrrKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, EsTATE AND GiFr
TAXATiON, 392-95 (4th ed. 1972).
71 In Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962), the reversion kept
the lessors from exercising full control. See also text infra on retention of the reversion.
7, John T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200 (1956), acquiesced in, 1957-2 Cum. BULL. 6.
72 Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814
(1965); Jack Wiles, 59 T.C. 289 (1972) aff'd per curiam, 33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-
571 (1974); Sidney W. Penn, 51 T.C. 144 (1968).
11 Brooke v. Commissioner, 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972); Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C.
524 (1965).
11 Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834
(1955). The facts of the case are given in note 68 supra.
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tain that status and they perform their duties. 75 Where an at-
torney or accountant is a mere figurehead trustee and does not
actively carry out his duties, however, the deduction will not
be allowed.
76
The courts look at positive action by the trustee as an
indication of independence. Enforcing default payment,77 exer-
cising the ability to rent or sell the corpus to others and to
invest the proceeds,78 and actively negotiating rentals serve to
demonstrate the relinquishment of taxpayer control. 79 Con-
versely, if the trustee is stripped of certain powers such as the
ability to sell80 or the ability to negotiate rent,81 he is not consid-
ered independent. The length of the lease as compared with the
duration of the trust also may reflect on trustee independence.
If the lease provisions severely restrict the trustee and the ini-
tial term plus options runs to the end of the trust, the trustee
is not independent because he has no power other than mere
rent collection.8 2 On the other hand, if there is arms length
bargaining, the negotiation of a long-term lease will not neces-
sarily be construed as negating trustee control, because it may
reflect sound business judgment and it is within the scope of
the exercise of the fiduciary duty.
The general rule is that the trustee cannot be considered
independent if the grantor continues to act as the owner or if
the grantor retains too many powers: e.g., if the taxpayer must
consent to a sale8 or could settle the accounts. 4 An apparent
exception to this principle is presented by the Skemp 85 case,
cited above, where, although the taxpayer retained the right to
15 Consolidated Apparel Co. v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1953); Brown
v. Commissioner, 180 F.2d 926 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 814 (1950); C. James
Mathews, 61 T.C. 12, 61 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 61.3 (1973).
7S Audano v. United States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970).
' Albert T. Felix, 21 T.C. 794 (1954), not acquiesced in, 1956-2 CUM. BULL. 10.
11 Id.; Perry v. United States, 33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-725 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
1' Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948); C. James Mathews, 61
T.C. 12, 61 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 61.3 (1973).
so Furman v. Commissioner, 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'g per curiam 45 T.C.
360 (1966). The grantor had to consent to any sale initiated by the trustee.
11 Robert F. Zumstein, 42 P-H T.C. MEM. 73,045 (1973).
51 Chace v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1969), afj'd per curiam,
442 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970).
See note 80, and accompanying text supra.
" Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962).
168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948).
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mortgage or exchange 6 the property, the court voiced no con-
cern as to the corporate trustee's independence. Still, since
these were the only retained powers and the rest of the facts
indicate actual independence, the deduction would probably
be upheld today. Nonetheless, the reservation of any controls
by the grantor creates a serious risk of a challenge by the IRS.
Most of the decisions concerning retention of management
control are issued after an ad hoc overview of the essence of the
transaction. The gift and leaseback of an office occupied by the
taxpayer both before and after the gift militates against the
rental deduction.87 Continuity of occupancy, and identical use
and operations s8 are merely two factors (not determinative in
themselves) that the court can use in a balancing test to judge
whether or not the grantor has retained control of the asset.
The foregoing discussion is perhaps best summarized by
the statement of the court in Alden B. Oakes" that the actual
independence of the trustee may be the "pivotal factor" in the
allowance of the deduction. As noted above, corporate trustees
will be assumed to be "actually independent", and attorneys
and accountants can generally pass a de facto "actually inde-
pendent" test. Because trustee independence can be pivotal, a
corporate trustee, an attorney, or an accountant is suggested.
Direct transfers to the children, without an intervening trust,
are discouraged. In a direct transfer, the Commissioner can
allege, and often show, that the grantor exercised the same
incidents of ownership'" before and after the transfer or that
there was no gift because there was no relinquishment of
88 On the other hand, the trustee determined the rent, the lease was only half as
long as the trust, and the trustee was an independent trust company.
" Chace v. United States, 442 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'g per curiam 303 F.
Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1969); Furman v. Commissioner, 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'g
per curiam 45 T.C. 360 (1966); Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.
1965); Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834
(1955); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928
(1952); Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962); Jefferson Black &
Supply Co., 59 T.C. 625 (1973); Sidney W. Penn, 51 T.C. 144 (1968); Burroughs Corp.,
33 T.C. 389 (1959); Raymond Cassidy, 20 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 51,182 (1951). Contra,
Skemp v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1948); C. James Mathews, 61 T.C. 12,
61 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 61.3 (1973); Alden B. Oakes, 44 T.C. 524 (1965).
IVan Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965), noted in 8 Amiz. L.
REv. 394 (1967).
" 44 T.C. 524, 529 (1965).
Ernest v. Berry, 33 P-H TAx CT. MENI. 64,181 (1964).
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ownership.' Moreover, with a direct transfer, the taxpayer can-
not rely upon the presumption of independence available in
many situations. Nor can he point to a written list of relin-
quished powers, as he can with a trust agreement. Unless the
children are of majority and can exercise an active role, the
taxpayer will have difficulty showing he did not keep the same
control over the property that he had before making the gift.
This is also true where the donee is the taxpayer's spouse.2
Notwithstanding all of this, one case has held that where all
the other gifts and leaseback requirements are met and a direct
transfer is made to the taxpayer's children, the children can
exercise their discretion to appoint the father as "manager" of
the asset without affecting his standing to claim the deduc-
tion. 3
B. Reasonable Rent and Written Lease
The second requirement of the tripartite test enunciated
in Mathews is that "[t]he leaseback should normally be in
writing and must require payment of a reasonable rental."94
Unfortunately, the Mathews court did little to illuminate the
criterion thus established; its only effort in that respect was to
summarily state that the lease in question was written and that
the rent was in fact reasonable. 5 "Reasonable rent", like "inde-
pendent trustee", is a phrase whose definition is elusive. The
statutory standard for rent is that it be "required to be made
as a condition to the continued use or possession"9 7 of the prop-
erty; of course, as with all other business expenses, it must also
be "ordinary and necessary"98 in order to be deductible.
" Burroughs Corp., 33 T.C. 389 (1959).
White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 928
(1952); Raymond M. Cassidy, 20 P-H TAx CT. MEM. 51,182 (1951).
13 A.N. McQuown, 22 P-H TAx. CT. MEM. 53,204 (1953). This is also true where
the grantor is the legally appointed guardian; see note 73 and accompanying text
supra. But see notes 68 and 74 and accompanying text supra.
" 61 T.C. 12, - , 61 P-H TAx CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 1 61.3 at 61-11 (1973).
See also 4 RIA TAXATION COORDINATOR T 4810.1, at 35,826A-B (Recent Developments,
Aug. 29, 1974).
"Id.






Ironically, the term "reasonable" is not explicitly applied
to rentals in the Code, although it is used in the contiguous
subsection of section 162 regulating deductions for "reasonable
allowance for salaries or compensation."99 This judge-made
doctrine,' 0 that rent must be reasonable to be deductible, rests
on the hypothesis that all rent is reasonable;'0 ' any portion of
a payment denominated as rent which the court disallows is,
therefore, not unreasonable, but rather is something other than
rent.' 2 This is seen most frequently where the court determines
that a lease with a purchase option is actually a sale; rental
payments have also been construed as disguised dividends.' 3
The excess over a reasonable amount of rent may likewise be
called a gift.
Many leases will set the amount of the rent as a percentage
of profits or asset value. The maximum percentage allowable
as "reasonable" in such instances has never been explicitly
determined and depends upon many circumstances. In one
case,'04 a leaseback calling for 10% of the royalties earned from
a patent was considered reasonable.
Where there is a sale and leaseback, the arms-length qual-
ity of the transaction is analyzed. 05 If the purchase price is
below fair market value'00 and the rent is greater than 50% of
the purchase price, 07 a sham will be concluded. On the other
hand, one court has stated that in a sale and leaseback, a rental
of 17% of the sale price is reasonable.' 9 Additionally, if the
rental expense is only accrued and not actually paid,09 no de-
:9 Id. §162(a)(1).
'0 Commissioner v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 176 F.2d 815, 817-18 (6th Cir. 1949); Limer-
icks Inc. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1948).
0I Stanley Imerman, 7 T.C. 1030 (1946).
112 Potter Elec. Signal Corp. v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 200 (8th Cir. 1961).
,03 Shaffer Terminals Inc., 16 T.C. 356 (1951), aff'd per curiam, 194 F.2d 539 (9th
Cir. 1952); Catherine G. Armston, 12 T.C. 539 (1949), aff'd sub nom., Armston Co. v.
Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531 (1951).
,0 Stearns Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1954).
,o Southeastern Canteen Co., 36 P-H TAx CT. MEm. 67,183 (1967), affd on this
issue, 410 F.2d 615 (6th Cir. 1969).
"I Shaffer Terminals, Inc., 194 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1952, aff'g per curiam 16 T.C.
356 (1951).
107 Ri erpoint Lace Works, Inc., 23 P-H TAX CT. ME-M. 54,143 (1954).
' Jefferson Block & Supply Co., 59 T.C. 625 (1973).
,00 Marvin & Lorraine May, 41 P-H TAX CT. MEs.. 72,070 (1972); Riverpoint
Lace Works, Inc., 23 P-H TAx CT. MEM. T 54,143 (1954).
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duction will be allowed. Nor will any gratuitous increase above
that legally obligated be treated as a deductible expense."" In
short, to be deductible, the rent must be paid and may neither
be too high nor too low."'
In Van Zandt v. Commissioner,"2 the Tax Court said that
the excessive portions of rental deductions should be excluded
because they are not "necessary". Shifting the deductibility
standard from "reasonable" to "necessary" does not vary the
amount of deductible rent, because the real test still is: what
would a third party pay? When the grantor pays the same rate
as unrelated tenants, the reasonableness of the rental deduc-
tion has never been questioned."3 The burden is always on the
taxpayer to controvert the Commissioner's assessment, and the
difficulty of establishing an objective standard for "ordinary
and necessary" was accurately described by Justice Cardozo in
Welch v. Helvering:
Many cases in the federal courts deal with phases of the
problem presented in the case at bar. To attempt to harmo-
nize them would be a futile task. They involve the apprecia-
tion of particular situations, at times with border line conclu-
sions.'"
As stated above, the Mathews test also requires the lease
to be reduced to writing; while this is generally true, the writing
and/or recordation of the transfer or .leaseback is not manda-
tory in all cases. However, the Commissioner may allege that
"I Commissioner v. Greenspun, 156 F.2d 917 (5th Cir. 1946) (the excess over a
"reasonable" rent was to be excised on remand); Roland P. Place, 17 T.C. 199 (1951)
aff'd per curiam, 199 F.2d 373 (6th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 927 (1953) (the
taxpayer voluntarily increased the rent to his wife). However, in J. A. Riggs Tractor
Co., 32 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 73-5805 (E.D. Ark. 1973), additional rent between family
members was sustained when commensurate value was added in services.
M 58th Street Plaza Theater, Inc. v. Commissioner, 195 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1952)
(subletting to stockholder's wife at less than fair market value distorted the income).
11 40 T.C. 824, 830-31 (1965).
"I Consolidated Apparel Co. v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1953); John
T. Potter, 27 T.C. 200 (1956), acquiesced in, 1957-2 CuM. BULL. 6; A.N. McQuown 22
P-H T.C. MEM. 53,204 (1953). Two cases involving other tenants have denied the
deduction, but both were on other grounds. Shaffer Terminals, Inc. v. Commissioner,
194 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1952), afj'g per curiam 16 T.C. 356 (1951) (in a sale and lease-
back, the rent was a substitute for dividends and the "sale" was at less than fair
market value and not at arm's length); Millard F. Machen, 35 P-H TAx CT. MEM.
66,193 (1966) (the grantor retained complete control over the asset).
"1 290 U.S. 111, 116 (1933).
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the lack of a writing is one of several elements showing that the
total transaction is a sham and that control did not pass to the
donees. Even where the trust is valid under state law, the fail-
ure to record it weighs against allowance of the deduction.
115
Moreover, if the IRS is informed of the transfer but the mortga-
gee of the property is not, the Commissioner may find the
transfer ineffective for tax purposes.11 Since the Commissioner
will expect the transfer to be recorded, generally no affirmative
significance will be attached to its being written. 7 An oral
transfer, however, may raise the negative inference of contin-
ued grantor control. On the other hand, in at least one case, the
court used the fact that the transfer was recorded to support
the deduction." ' If the recordation is inordinately tardy,
though, it will not have an affirmative effect."'
C. Business Purpose
The "business purpose" doctrine was first enunciated in
Gregory v. Helvering.'20 Its basic dictate is that while all legiti-
mate means may be used to avoid income taxes, transactions
giving rise to a business deduction must have an ulterior busi-
ness purpose: artiface must not be exalted above reality.' 2' This
holding was interpreted in Higgins v. Smith 2 to mean that
"transactions, which do not vary control or change the flow of
economic benefits, are to be dismissed from consideration."'1'
The court explained that the rationale for excluding such
transactions springs from the essence of taxation:
The purpose here is to tax earnings and profits less expenses
and losses. If one or the other factor in any calculation is
I' Furman v. Commissioner, 381 F.2d (5th Cir. 1967), af'g per curiam 45 T.C.
360 (1966) (neither the trust nor the lease was recorded).
1t6 Id.
"7 Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
814 (1965); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
928 (1952).
,,S teams Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 849 (7th Cir. 1954).
"' Sidney W. Penn, 51 T.C. 144 (1968). The recordation of the trust was given no
effect, because it was seven months after the transaction had purportedly occurred.
Id., at 151 n.1.
,' 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
Id. at 470.
308 U.S. 473 (1940).
' Id. at 476.
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unreal, it distorts the liability of the particular taxpayer to
the detriment or advantage of the entire tax-paying group.' 4
The finding of a business purpose in gift and leaseback
cases turns solely upon whether the court views the venture as
one integrated transaction or as two separate ones. If the court
sees only one transaction, it will not allow the deduction, since
there is no business purpose in giving the property away and
putting oneself in the position of making a "necessary" rental
payment.ss It will be treated as a camouflaged assignment of
income.' 6 The alternative line of attack views the transaction
after the gift was completed and questions only whether there
was a legitimate purpose in the grantor renting the asset in
question. In the Mathews case, the Tax Court used the latter
approach and asked if there was a "business purpose" in an
undertaker renting a funeral home. Obviously, the answer was
affirmative. By viewing the transaction after the gift had been
completed, the court did not have to question the business
motives of the undertaker who gave away a funeral home that
he would then have to rent.
To meet the business purpose requirement, the dealings
must have furthered a valid business aim. A legitimate non-
business purpose, such as avoidance of a divorce settlement
increase will not pass the test."' Even a sale and leaseback
must have a legitimate business motive,'18 although it is sub-
ject to a less stringent standard than is the gift and leaseback.
The courts sometimes hold that a deduction will be denied
if the transaction lacks "economic reality"'2 9 (i.e., futhers no
121 Id. at 477, citing in footnote, Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 537 (1937).
"I Furman v. Commissioner, 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967), aff'g per curiam 45 T.C.
360 (1966); Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
814 (1965); Kirschenmann v. Westover, 225 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.
834 (1955); White v. Fitzpatrick, 193 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
928 (1952); Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962); Unger v. Camp-
bell, 7 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 547 (N.D. Tex. 1960); Southeastern Canteen Co., 36 P-H
T.C. MEM. 67,183 (1967).
121 Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (1965).
12 Ernest V. Berry, 33 P-H T.C. MEM. 64,181 (1964). Petitioner purchased
equipment in his girl friend's name to avoid its inclusion in his assets subject to a
divorce settlement.
,u Century Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951), discussed in
Cary Il, supra note 25 at 961-972.
I" Audano v. United States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970); Irvin K. Furman, 45
T.C. 360 (1966), aff'd per curiam, 381 F.2d 22 (5th Cir. 1967); I. E. Van Zandt, 40 T.C.
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economic objective). This test is related to "business purpose",
but is rarely used because its standards are even less clearly
defined than those of the "business purpose" doctrine.
"Lacking economic reality" is a court's shorthand for a blanket
disapproval of the objectives of the transaction and of the
means used to reach those objectives. Its use is tantamount to
a determination that the transaction is merely a "sham".
One author has suggested that instead of seeking a "busi-
ness purpose", courts should simply ascertain whether "a suffi-
cent property interest has been transferred to justify shifting
the incidence of taxation." 3 ' This has conceptual consistency
with the Higgens test, supra, and although somewhat vague, it
is a more equitable criterion than the "business purpose" doc-
trine.
IV. DIsQUALIFYING EQUITY
The most recent attack by the IRS has been upon grantors
who retain a reversion in the transferred property. Section
162(a) (3) of the Code allows rental deductions only for property
"in which the taxpayer has no equity," and the Commissioner
has ruled that the deduction will be denied where the lessee
retains a reversionary interest.
The Mathews decision is one of the few to interpret this
clause of Section 162. In Mathews there was a valid Clifford
trust' 3' with the reversion to the taxpayer at its termination.
The Tax Court reasoned that the "equity" referred to above
must mean something other than a right enforceable in a court
of equity; since specific performance is always available to a
lessee, no deduction would ever be allowed if the literal mean-
ing was applied. The court therefore decided to drop a strict
reading of the statute; it was then free to follow the probable
intent of Congress.'32 In that regard, the court concluded that
Congress desired to disqualify those interests in-the property
824 (1963), aff'd, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814 (1965). The tax
court in A. N. McQuown stated that since there was a valid gift, there was economic
reality. 22 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 53,204 (1953). See also Note GEO., supra note 2, at
238, n.219.
10 Oliver, supra note 2, at 31.
3I It conformed to the provisions of §§ 671-77 of the CODE.
132 61 T.C. 12, 61 P-H TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC. 61.3 (1973).
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taken from the lessor and not interests which the lessee had
possessed from independent sources. Thus, since the trust was
only a transfer for a term of years, the taxpayer never "took"
anything from the lessor, but merely had a future interest left
after the lessor's interest was carved from the full fee.ln The
court held that where the rental payments do not enlarge the
petitioner's ownership, the rent deduction should be allowed:
We are therefore of the view that section 162(a)(3) should not
be read to cause rental payments to become nondeductible
merely by virtue of a lessee's property rights in an asset,
which rights are not derived from the lessor or under the
lease, and which will become possessory only after the lease
expires." 4
In other words, since the rental was merely for use of the prop-
erty, it should be deductible just as it would be for an unrelated
third party. The fact that the lessor had a future right to per-
manent possession should have no effect, since the rent did not
enlarge his interest nor did it hasten the time that the reversion
would become possessory.
Prior to the Mathews case, only four cases had considered
the "disqualifying equity" argument;1 31 one has addressed it
since. 136 This argument has been advanced by the IRS (and
rejected by the courts), in the three most recent gift and
leaseback cases and seems to be the newest weapon in the
Commissioner's arsenal. Still, since no appellate court has ex-
plicitly ruled on this point yet, the weight of cases should be
judged accordingly.
In Hall v. United States, ' 3' decided in 1962, the taxpayer's
rent deduction was denied because he retained too much con-
trol over the asset. In addition, the court seized upon the "dis-
qualifying equity" argument as a second, independent ground
"1 Id. T 61.3, at 61-12.
131 Id. T 61.3, at 61-13 (1973). This passage is quoted in Perry v. United States,
33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-725, 74-728. (E.D.N.C. 1974).
'" Duffy v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 4 (S.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd on other grounds,
487 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1973); Gibbons v. United States, 25 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 70-1332
(D.N. Mex. 1970); Chace v. United States, 303 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1969), aff'd
per curiam, 422 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970); Hall v. United States, 208 F. Supp. 584
(N.D.N.Y. 1962).
Im Perry v. United States, 33 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 74-725 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
131 208 F. Supp. 584 (N.D.N.Y. 1962).
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for the denial of the deduction.'38 In a 1969 Florida federal
district court case, the court pointed to the retention of the
reversion as one of a number of factors which caused the deduc-
tion to be denied. This case, Chace v. United States,'39 was
affirmed per curiam without a definitive holding on the "dis-
qualifying equity" reasoning of the Internal Revenue Service.
The court in Gibbons v. United States' followed the literal
language of the statute and the strict interpretation urged by
the Commissioner: section 162(a)(3) does not allow rental de-
ductions if the taxpayer has an equity in property; a reversion
is an equity; therefore, since the taxpayer retained a reversion,
the deduction must be disallowed. This case was decided in
1970.
The three cases since Gibbons have all held for the tax-
payer on this point. One of these, Mathews, has already been
extensively discussed. The most recent case is Perry v. United
States, 4' where a doctor transfered his office building to a valid
Clifford trust, paying reasonable rent and retaining a reversion.
A corporate trustee with broad powers was appointed, and the
leaseback was for the life of the trust. The IRS interposed only
two contentions: (1) the whole transaction was a sham and (2)
the taxpayer retained a prohibited equitable interest. The
court dismissed the first argument since there was a corporate
trustee and the grantor retained no control. Likewise, it re-
jected the second contention and allowed the deduction, ex-
plaining that:
[t]raditionally the words "in which he has no equity" as
used in this statute have been construed to preclude a busi-
ness expense deduction for payments made by a mortgagor
or conditional vendee to acquire property as distinguished
from payments made for the use of the property. In this case
the rental payments being made by the taxpayers do not
enlarge their ownership but are simply for the use of the
property during the term of the trust.1
2
'' Id. at 588.
, 303 F. Supp. 513 (M.D. Fla. 1969), aff'd per curiam 422 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970).
25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-1332 (D.N. Mex. 1970).
, 33 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d 74-725 (E.D.N.C. 1974).
142 Id. at 74-728. The Court cites Duffy v. United States, 343 F. Supp. 4 (S.D. Ohio




The Perry (1974) court relied on the reasoning of the decisions
of Mathews' and Duffy v. United States."4 Duffy was the first
case to embrace the above quoted logic in a discussion of dis-
qualifying equity and, thus, the first case to hold for the tax-
payer. However, Duffy was reversed on other grounds and the
appellate court (the United States Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit) did not decide the validity of the rental deduc-
tion. The Sixth Circuit had not previously reviewed a gift and
leaseback case.
Whether the court accepts or rejects the deduction because
of a disqualifying equity will normally depend on whether it
applies a strict or liberal interpretation of the section 162(a)(3)
language: "in which the taxpayer has no equity." In any event,
the important point to remember is that this problem can eas-
ily be avoided by the taxpayer transfering the reversion to his
children or his wife.I" In Mathews, for example, the IRS did not
challenge the rental deduction after the grantor transferred
the reversion to his wife. This seems to indicate that the Com-
missioner will allow the deduction when the grantor does not
retain the reversion, provided the other formalities are fol-
lowed.'46 By transferring the reversion simultaneously with the
estate for years, 4 ' the grantor not only increases his chances of
being upheld on his income tax rental deduction, 4 8 but also
"1 33 Am. Fed. Tax. R.2d at 74-728. The court stated that it was persuaded by
the tax court opinion in Mathews.
"1 343 F. Supp. 4 (S.D. Ohio 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 487 F.2d 282 (6th Cir.
1973). See, note 142 supra.
15 See Josephs & Glicker, supra note 9, at 40.
"' Id.
"17 Simmons, New Developments in the "Gift and Leaseback" in Tax Planning for
the Professional, 51 TAXEs 654, 658 (1973). This author, who has several excellent
articles in this area, suggests it would be foolish not to transfer the reversion in light
of the IRS' placing gift and leaseback cases on the Prime Issue List where a Clifford
trust is used.
See note 147 supra. The following figures indicate how the taxpayer has fared
in court. They are intended only for informational purposes and are not to be used as
a guide for gift and leaseback planning. The reader is left to attach the significance to
them that he desires after considering: the types of issues that come before each court;
the fact that the taxpayer must pay the assessment to get into district court; the right
to demand ajury trial in district court; and the fact that tax court judges are specialists
in the field of taxation.
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rids himself of the estate tax consequences 4 ' arising from re-
taining the reversion. Of course, a gift tax'50 must be paid on
the gift of the reversion and if it goes to someone other than the
owner of the current interest, the transferor will not get the
benefit of the $3000 exclusion (which applies only to present
interests).5' Moreover, although a transfer of the reversion re-
quires the grantor to give up all formal control over the corpus,
the grantor still has informal familial control; additionally, the
children will often ultimately receive the assets or the proceeds
from the asset. Thus, an early transfer of the reversion simply
represents the acceleration of an eventuality rather than a
change in the final result.
V. DISCHARGE OF OBLIGATIONS
The purpose of the transfer and leaseback is to shift in-
come, but that income can be re-attributed to the grantor in
two different situations. If the grantor uses the trust to dis-
charge his legal obligations of support it will be taxable to
him.'5 2 In Brooke v. United States,'0 the Ninth Circuit deter-
Here are the latest box scores for fiscal 1973:
Taxpayer Taxpayer Split
Wins Losses Decisions
Tax Court-Regular Cases 15.8% 49.1% 35.1%
Tax Court-Small Tax Cases 12.1 52.2 35.4
District Court 30.5 58.0 11.5
Court of Appeals 21.9 71.9 6.2
Court of Claims 23.7 68.4 7.9
Supreme Court 88.9 11.1 -0-
Back at the administrative level, about 75% of the taxpayers who
went to the IRS Appellate Division settled their cases there. The aver-
age settlement was for about 40% of the claimed deficiencies and
penalties. In the previous two years, the settlement percentage was only
about 30%.
How Taxpayers Fared, 7 PRAc. Acar. May/June, 1974, at 32.
"' CODE §2037(a)(2). If the value of the reversionary interest exceeds 5% immedi-
ately before death, the entire value of the asset is includible in the gross estate; if the




153 468 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1972), discussed in Gift and leaseback technique given
a shot in the arm by CA-9, 37 J. TAX. 315 (1972); D.C. reverses itself: income of
guardian follows support, 31 J. TAX. 102 (1969); Rev. Rul. 484, 1956-2 CuM. BuLL. 23,
24.
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mined that only the money actually expended for items of sup-
port was attributable to the grantor. If the income is used to
form another business' or to purchase luxury items,'54 it is not
attributable to the grantor. Items of support are prescribed by
state law.
Trust income that fulfills the taxpayer's obligation on a
mortgage of the trust corpus also is taxable to him. 55 This may
have special significance where the parent retains primary lia-
bility on the mortgage. If a father transfers to his minor chil-
dren a building encumbered by a mortgage and, further, if
under state law or by agreement with the mortgagee he remains
primarily liable, the Commissioner may attribute the mortgage
payments to the father-grantor. This is usually an inconse-
quential problem, however, since the children ordinarily will be
primarily liable and the trust income will be used to discharge
their legal obligation, with the father merely a surety.58
VI. EFFECTS OF RENT DEDUCTION DENIAL
The courts have not often ventured outside the narrow,
primary issue of the deductibility of the rent payments, but in
those instances where the rent deduction is denied, some very
important secondary questions arise. As stated above, the tax-
savings in a gift and leaseback transaction derives from taking
the rent deduction instead of the business expenses of deprecia-
tion, maintenance, insurance, interest and taxes [hereinafter
referred to as ownership deductions]. If the rent deduction is
disallowed, can the grantor-lessee deduct these ownership de-
ductions, or should they go to the lessor, who has legal title?
The answer, of course, will depend upon the line of reasoning
"I, Plath v. United States, 48 Am. Fed. Tax R. 1285 (E.D. Wash. 1954). See also
Erlich, The Effective Use of Support Trusts: Trusts for Minors, Custodian Statutes,
Gifts of Future Interests, N.Y.U. 19TH INST. ON FED. TAX 729, 737-38 (1961).
"I Jenn v. United States, 25 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 70-756 (S.D. Ind. 1970), discussed
in Price, supra note 2, at 183. Where the mortgage exceeds the adjusted tax basis, then
the transfer is a realization of income. One author argues if the transferor is to continue
the mortgage payments, "the rule should be otherwise." Price, supra note 2, at 186.
"" For discussions of the mortagage question see supra note 155; see also, Jack
Wiles, 59 T.C. 289, 300-302 (1972); Irvine K. Furman, 45 T.C. 360, 366 (1966). The
Furman opinion points out this can be a very thorny problem. The best solution is for
a written and recorded assumption of the mortgage by the grantees at the same time
as the gift of the asset.
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adopted by the court in each case. If the court disallows the
rent deduction because the grantor retained the same manage-
ment or control over the asset that he had prior to the transfer,
then he should be granted the ownership deductions. This
would place the parties in the same position as if they had
never entered into the transaction. 57 On the other hand, if the
rent deduction is disallowed because of a disqualifying equity,
then the donee-lessor should keep the ownership deductions.
This would increase the grantor's income taxes by the amount
of the rent times his marginal tax rate. 5 In short, the reason
that the Court denies the deduction may have a significant
effect on the additional tax liability incurred.
If the rent deduction is denied, the rental payments must
"I Froelich, Clifford Trusts: Use of Partnership Interests as Corpus; Leaseback
Arrangements, 52 CALF. L. REv. 956, 967-77 (1964). Two cases have used this reasoning
with direct transfers and leasebacks. Millard F. Machen, 35 P-H TAX CT. MEM.
66,193 (1966). Raymond M. Cassidy, 20 P-H TAX CT. MEM. 51,182 (1951).
I"' If the grantor had taxable income of $55,000 before a $15,000 rental deduction,
then his net taxable income would be $40,000. If the depreciation and other deductible
expense4 were $10,000, then the trust or grantee would have net taxable income of
$5000 (15,000 - 10,000). If the deduction is denied, but the grantor gets the operating
expenses, then the grantor pays tax on $45,000 (55,000 - 10,000). (The status of the
$15,000 payment to the trust will be handled later in the text.) Thus the difference in
tax liability is the difference between the tax on $45,000 and the tax on $40,000; if the
professional had not entered into gift and leaseback, he would be in the same position
as if the deduction were denied and he got the operating deductions.
Where the deduction is denied but the operating expenses are not allowed to the
grantor, he must pay tax on $55,000. This is an increase in tax liability of the incremen-
tal tax on the $15,000 rental deduction, (i.e., difference in tax between the tax on
$40,000 and on $55,000). Noteworthy is the further observation that if the taxpayer
had not entered into the trust and leaseback, he would have to pay on $45,000. With-
out the rent deduction or the operating expenses, he now has to pay tax on $55,000;
thus, he is worse off by the amount of the tax on the operating expenses at the pre-
vailing marginal tax rate than if he had not entered into the gift and leaseback; he is
worse off by the tax on the amount of the rent at the prevailing marginal tax rate than
if the deduction had been allowed.
Both the discussion in the footnotes and the text treat the "operating expenses"
as the same type of deductions, which the courts would determine were all deductible
by either the grantor or grantee. There seems to be no problem with allowing the
grantor to take the depreciation expense if the Court holds there was too much control
by the grantor. However, the expenses of maintenance, taxes, interests, and insurance
all require a cash flow. In order for these to be deductible, it would seem an agency or
constructive trust logic would have to be employed-in other words, if the lessors
receive money in their own names and expend it in order to fulfill a lease obligation or
to maintain the asset, then even if a court decides that the lessee still controls the asset,
it would seem that the lessee can not take over a deduction for an expenditure which
the lessor made with his own funds, without the use of an agency theory.
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also be characterized from the lessor's viewpoint. Presumably,
they are either income or gifts, and there are arguments for
both characterizations. Since by denying the deduction, the
court has ruled the payments were not necessary and not a
condition of occupancy, it would seem that they would be gra-
tuitous and thus taxed to the lessee as gifts to the lessors"' with
the $3000 annual exclusion applicable. 60 On the other hand, if
the lessee made the payments believing them to be necessary,
then there is no donative character to the transaction and thus
no gift; therefore the payments would be income' to the les-
sors.'
It will generally be more advantageous to the taxpayer and
his family' for these "rent" payments to be labeled gifts to the
lessors.' At least one "better view"'6 4 permits just such a re-
sult. This view is conceptually sound since the Commissioner
contends that there is no business purpose in gift and leaseback
transactions and that their sole consequence is a gratuitous
assignment of income; to negate this assignment, he desires
that the transaction be a "nullity". If the trust and leaseback
were not used, the grantor would get a deduction for his operat-
ing expenses; in order to get money to his children, he would
be required to give gifts from his taxable income. Where the
rental deduction has been denied, this result can best be dupli-
cated by classifying the rent payments as gifts to the lessors.
"' Note GEO., supra note 2, at 239, n. 226. This is also the official IRS stand.
Rev. Rul. 315, 1957-2 CuM. BuLL. 624. In this ruling the Commissioner cited Lockard
v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 409 (1st Cir. 1948); See also notes following Lockard in B.
BrmTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INcoME ESTATE AND Gr TAXATION, 1013-1014 (4th ed.
1972).
"' CODE §§ 2501(a)(1), 2503(b). In many cases, this provision alone will be suffi-
cient to exclude the entire annual rent from gift taxation. This is especially true where
the grantor is able to employ the split gift approach.
... CODE §§ 61, 102. Donative intent is not required for a transfer to be taxed as a
gift, but it does play a large part. The transaction must at least be donative in charac-
ter. Bradford v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 1059, 1063-64 (1960).
",2 Van Zandt v. Commissioner, 341 F.2d 440 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 814
(1965). The Court explicitly stated the question was not before it, so this is merely
dictum.
"I This of course depends upon the amount of gifts given within the year and the
total accumulated. It also depends on whether the benficiaries have other income
against which they offset the trust deductions, if the grantees are to receive them. A
fuller discussion is beyond the scope of this comment.
"I Note GEO., supra note 2, at 239-40.
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The revende rulings seem to support this reasoning. '65
Notwithstanding such authority, a cogent argument can
be made to the contrary. The Supreme Court has ruled that
where there is some dispute as to whether money received is
gift or income, then the controlling factor is the intention of the
transferor:16 whether the "constraining force of any moral or
legal duty"'67 impels the transfer or whether the transfer "pro-
ceeds from a 'detached and disinterested generosity"" . . . 'out
of affection, respect, admiration, charity or like impulses' ,.,69
With gift and leaseback the primary motive is donative, but
the immediate intention is to discharge the legal duty to pay
rent. Therefore, a decision refusing to construe the rent pay-
ments as gifts would not be totally without foundation.
One additional, particularly disturbing development in
the law with respect to the gift and leaseback deserves further
comment here. If a trust is set up with the donated asset as its
corpus, its income will be the rent paid by the grantor and its
deductions the ownership expenses delineated above. If the
income from this trust is attributable to the grantor, and the
rental-deduction is allowed, the taxpayer would be in the same
position as if he had not entered into the transaction (i.e., the
position in which the Commissioner is desirous of putting
him) .170 However, two cases have arisen where the grantor has
had the trust's income attributed to him and has not been
allowed to take the rental deduction.' 7' Such decisions are
,15 Rev. Rul. 315, 1957-2 CUM. BULL. 624, modifying Rev. Rul. 9, 1954-1 Cum. BLL.
20.
10 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1960), citing Bogardis v.
Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 43 (1937).
--7 Id. at 285, citing Bogardis v. Commissioner, 302 U.S. 34, 41 (1937).
,' Id. at 285, citing Commissioner v. Lobue, 351 U.S. 243, 246 (1956).
"' Id. at 285, citing Robertson v. United States, 343 U.S. 711, 714 (1951).
370 Duffy v. United States, 487 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1973). The court ruled the trust
did not divorce control from the grantor. The rental deduction question was not
reached by the appellate court.
'"' Audano v. United States, 428 F.2d 251 (5th Cir. 1970); Jack Wiles, 59 T.C. 289
(1972). The first invalidated the trust as controlled by the grantor; the latter attributed
as income mortgage payments made by the trust.
The denial of the rent deduction coupled with the attribution of the income to the
grantor can be a devastating instance of double taxation. Suppose the grantor has
sufficient other income to put himself at the 70% marginal tax rate on unearned
income. Assume further than the rent paid is $30,000 and the deductible expenses by
the trust (depreciation, insurance, interest, taxes and maintenance) are $12,000. Thus,
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grossly unfair to the taxpayer and emphasize the need for the
courts, and Congress, to look more closely at the effect of rent
deduction denials.
CONCLUSION
The gift and leaseback transaction is one about which few
definitive statements can be made with certainty. 72 Neverthe-
less, current case law has produced a number of tentative
guidelines which can be outlined 3 as follows: (1) the transfer
and lease should both be in writing; (2) there should generally
be a trust established with a corporate trustee, unless the do-
nees in a direct transfer situation are sufficiently capable of
exercising real management and control; (3) the trustee should
by taking the rental deduction, the taxpayer saves (70%) ($30,000) = $21,000 in taxes.
If he had not entered into the gift and leaseback, he would have saved only (70%)
($12,000) = $8,400 in taxes. If the court riles that the income should be attributed to
the taxpayer, then the tax liability will be the marginal tax rate times the net income
to the trust: (70%) ($30,000 - $12,000) = $12,600 in taxes. Thus, if the rent deduction
is allowed and the income attributed, then the taxpayer comes out exactly where he
was if he hadn't entered into the trust and leaseback: he has saved $8,400 ($21,000 -
$12,600).
However, in Audano, the rent deduction was denied and the income was attrib-
uted to the grantor. In this example, the deficiency would be the loss of the rental
deduction's tax savings ($21,000) plus the tax on the attributed income ($12,600) or
$33,600-more tax is owed than the deduction itself. This ludicrous result can be the
outcome where the tests of rent deductibility and adherence to the Clifford standards
are not meshed.
The characterization of the payments as to the lessor's tax status will not be
discussed, other than to note that support payments are not taxable either as income
or as a gift to the lessor.
"72 The only statement one can make with some assurance is that the transaction
will be scrutinized closely, just as all intra-family transactions are. Beyond that there
are the conflicting views: the IRS will challenge every gift and leaseback rental deduc-
tion since this is a "prime issue", supra note 5; on the other hand, the treatise writers
say that the "[m]ere existence of a leaseback arrangement between related parties
does not of itself create such an atmosphere as to warrant automatic disallowance of
rental payments. In each case there must be an ad hoc examination of all the facts
and circumstances." 4A J. MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §25.111, at 511 (Revi-
sion 1972).
This "ad hoc examination" will likely end up in the courts, because "Prime Issues
are ones which, if raised, cannot, as a matter of IRS policy, be 'settled' by closing
agreement or compromise and therefore must be litigated." Simmons, New
Developments in the "Gift and Leaseback" in Tax Planning for the Professional, 51
TAXES 654, 658 (1973).
,73 See also Kornfield, A New Look at Family Trust Leaseback Arrangements, 104
TRUSTS AND ESTATES 1121, 1187 (1965).
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have broad discretion and extensive powers; (4) the rent paid
should be that which an unrelated tenant might pay; and (5)
the grantor should not retain the reversion though under recent
decisions it appears that the deduction may be allowed even if
the grantor-lessee does retain the reversion.
The planning perspectives from which to view gift and
leaseback transactions have been discussed at length above.
Recommendations for each facet of the transaction have been
delineated and the courts' views on deviations from those rec-
ommendations have been illustrated. It remains only for this
author to appeal to Congress to legislate concerning this 25-
year old tax-minimization tactic, for, clearly, the only answer
to the problems it presents is congressional action. The words
of the tax court in Estelle Morris Trusts'74 concerning multiple
trusts are equally applicable to the gift and leaseback:
We do not intend to imply that we believe congressional inac-
tion here means complete sanction of tax avoidance through
multiple accumulation trusts. Rather, we believe the lesson
to be learned is that courts should be wary of broad-scale
incorporation of the doctrine of "tax avoidance" or "business
'purpose" or "sham" in an area so fraught with its own partic-
ular problems and nuances. At the very least, we are required
to limit those judicially developed doctrines to the situations
which they were intended to cover."'
Until Congress voices its intent, taxpayers and the IRS will
continue to flail at each other in attempting to thrash out com-
mon law guidelines. -This could be effort better spent if a stat-
ute were available to avert such skirmishes.
Charles J. Lavelle
7 Estelle Morris Trusts, 51 T.C. 20 (1968).
m Id. at 43.
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